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The U.S.-EC Hormone Beef Controversy and the
Standards Code: Implications for the Application
of Health Regulations to Agricultural Trade
I. Introduction
Effective January 1, 1989, the European Community (EC)
banned' all trade in beef 2 treated with growth hormones (hormone
beef). This ban resulted in the United States losing an export market
valued at approximately 145 million dollars per year. 3 The Europe-
ans claim the ban is needed to protect consumers from possible
health risks associated with these hormones. 4 U.S. trade officials,
however, have charged that the ban is not based on scientific evi-
dence and is in actuality the institution of an unjustified nontariff
trade barrier (NTB). 5 The United States retaliated by imposing tar-
iffs on European imports designed to equal the estimated damage to
American beef exports. 6
This Comment examines the implications of the EC's decision
to ban trade in hormone beef in the context of the Agreement on
Technical Barriers to Trade 7 (Standards Code or Code), an agree-
ment concluded in 1979 during the Tokyo Round of trade negotia-
tions within the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).8
1 Council Directive 85/649/EEC, 28 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 382) arts. 5 & 6(l), at
229-30 (1985) [hereinafter Council Directive]. The use of growth hormones in European
beef was originally banned effective January 1, 1988, but the ban on imports was deferred
to January 1, 1989, after U.S. objections. Id. at art. 6(5), at 230; Montgomery, US and
Europe .Vear Trade War Over Hormone Use in Beef Cattle, N.Y. Times, Nov. 20, 1988, § I, at 22,
col. 5.
2 The Directive technically applies to all livestock, but since the European concern
and the current trade controversy have been over the Directive's application to beef in
particular the Directive will be discussed primarily in that regard.
3 Montgomery, supra note 1.
4 The EC Directive itself carefully skirts this issue, however, and uses a free trade
rationale to justify the ban. See infra notes 22-27 and accompanying text.
5 U.S. Assails Import Plan, N.Y. Times, Feb. 12, 1987, at D14, col. 2.
6 Montgomery, supra note 1.
7 Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, opened for signature April 12, 1979, 31
U.S.T. 405, T.I.A.S. No. 9616, - U.N.T.S. - (1979) [hereinafter Standards Code].
8 The Standards Code was one of six codes of conduct adopted in the Tokyo Round
to address nontariff barriers to trade. Stern and Hoekman, The Codes Approach, in THE
URUGUAY ROUND: A HANDBOOK ON THE MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS 59, 59 (1987).
None of the rules contained in the new codes could have been incorporated
into the GATT in the form of an amendment to the General Agreement since
such an amendment would have required the consent of two thirds of the
member countries ... Only through separate codes, therefore, was it possi-
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The United States and the EC have tried, thus far unsuccessfully, to
resolve their dispute over the EC's hormone beef legislation through
application of this Code. This Comment will highlight substantive
and procedural shortcomings of the Standards Code that have been
manifested by the hormone beef controversy, placing greater em-
phasis on the ramifications of the substantive deficiencies.
The current dispute is interesting from an international law per-
spective not only because of the specific trade conflict itself but be-
cause of the questions it raises about the weight that should be given
to public health policy questions in international trade agreements.
Specifically, what level of health risk warrants trade restrictions on
agricultural products? This Comment points out that health risk as-
sessment of food additives is problematic, and suggests that in a
world of rising consumer concern over healthy food the problem of
food additives may be incapable of being adequately addressed
through the present Code.
II. The EC Directive
A. Origins of the Directive
The Council of Agriculture Ministers9 of the European Commu-
nities decided in December 198510 to ban the sale or importation of
animals and meat from animals raised with growth hormones." I This
decision was a response to "mounting public concern in Europe over
the use of [growth] hormones in animal production."' 12 Environ-
mentalists and consumer groups had been preoccupied for years
ble to increase the level of obligations of those member countries that were
willing to assume further legal commitments.
Roessler, The Scope, Limits and Function of the GATT Legal System, in TRADE POLICIES FOR A
BETrER FUTURE 71, 74 (1987). The Standards Code has been the most popular of these
codes, garnering 36 signatories. Id.
9 The Council "is the final E.G. decision-making body." THE E.C. OFFICE OF PRESS
AND PUBLIC AFFAIRS, THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY 8 (1987). "The Council is made up of the
representatives of the governments of the 12 Member States. Each government normally
sends one of its ministers. Its membership thus varies with the subjects down for discus-
sion." E. NOEL, WORKING TOGETHER-THE INSTITUTIONS OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY 5
(1988).
10 Council Directive, supra note 1.
II The hormones include natural sex hormones like estrogen and testosterone, as
well as synthetic ones. Kolata, Hormone-treated Beef Termed Generally Safe, N.Y. Times, Jan. I,
1989, at 22, col. 1. A one dollar hormone pellet "can save $20 in fattening costs and cut
the feeding period by 18 days, increasing the number of animals that can be fattened at a
feed lot each year." Freudenheim, Beef Dispute: Stakes High in Trade War, N.Y. Times,Jan. 1,
1989, § I, at I, col. 3. "A typical steer or heifer being fattened for slaughter will gain 50
more pounds in lean meat rather than fat ifa hormone pellet is implanted [in its ear], and
it will eat four fewer bushels of corn." Id. Estimates of the usage of hormones in the
United States vary from 50 to 55% of U.S. cattle. Ross, US. Challenges EC Plan to Ban
Treated Beef, Christian Sci. Monitor, Nov. 21, 1988, at 3, to 70 to 90%. Freudenheim, supra.
Growth hormones are estimated to save the U.S. meat industry upwards of $650 million a
year. Id.
12 US. Assails Import Plan, supra note 5.
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with the use of growth hormones in animal production and had
waged a "long battle" in the European Parliament' 3 to have the ban
enacted. 14
European worries were first raised in 1981 when a number of
infants in Italy became ill after eating baby food contaminated with a
synthetic estrogen.' 5 None of the infants died, 16 but the effects nev-
ertheless were dramatic. "Infants of both sexes developed breasts,
for example, and some infant girls began menstruating."' 7
The outcry over this incident was great, obscuring the fact that
the hormone used by the Italian farmers had already been banned in
both Europe and the United States and had been illegally purchased
by the farmers on the black market.' 8 An inquiry into the use of
other hormones in meat was ordered by the European Commission,
"but .. .[the] committee of inquiry was disbanded when it became
clear it would find no evidence beef-fattening steroids were damag-
ing to humans."' 19 At the time, Franz Andriessen, the EC's farm
commissioner, said, "Scientific advice is important, but it is not deci-
sive. In public opinion, this is a very delicate issue that has to be
dealt with in political terms." 20
B. The Language of the Directive
The language of the EC Directive 2' "prohibit[s]" the "use of
hormonal substances for fattening purposes," 22 and requires EC
member states to "prohibit importation from third countries of ani-
mals and of meat from animals to which [hormonal substances] have
been administered in any way whatsoever .... ",23 The rationale for
the ban is not based on the perceived health effects of growth hor-
mones, the "assessments" of which, the Directive acknowledges,
13 "The European Parliament ... is the Community's only directly elected body. Its
518 members debate issues, question the Commission and the Council, and scrutinize
proposed legislation .... [It] has not been given legislative powers like those of national
parliaments." THE E.C. OFFICE OF PRESS AND PUBLIC AFFAIRS, supra note 9.
14 Montgomery, Europeans to Offer Plan to Ease Trade Dispute W1'ith U.S., N.Y. Times, Jan.
4, 1989, at D20, col. I; Auerbach, EC Ban on US. Beef Imports Could Trigger Trade il'ar, Wash.
Post, Dec. 13, 1988, at BI, col. 4.
15 Mackenzie, European Community Beefs About Use of US. Meat Hormones, Christian Sci.
Monitor, Mar. 24, 1988, at 14, col. I; Kolata, supra note 11.
16 Mackenzie, supra note 15.
17 Kolata, supra note 11.
18 Id.
19 Mackenzie, supra note 15; see also Freudenheim, supra note 11.
20 Freudenheim, supra note 11 (emphasis added). According to one commentator, the
EC's decision to ban growth hormones marked "the first time the EC took into account the
interests of consumers." Hunter, Francois Lamy: How France's .ader ll'on Ban on Hormone-
Treated Meat, Wash. Post, Dec. 25, 1988. at H3, col. 1.
21 "Directives are binding on the Member States to which they are addressed as re-
gards the results to be achieved, but leave the form and methods of achieving it [sic] to the
discretion of the national authorities." E. NOEL, supra note 9, at 7.
22 Council Directive, supra note 1, Preamble, 228.
23 Id. at art. 6, 1, at 230.
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"vary." 2 4 Instead, the ban is principally grounded on a somewhat
disingenuous free trade argument.
The Directive notes that various EC member states had enacted
differing regulations on the use of growth hormones, 25 and asserts
that the variations in these regulations "distortjed] the conditions of
competition in [animal] products" and was "a serious barrier to in-
tra-Community trade." 2 6 The only solution which would overcome
the distortions, reasons the Directive, is one which would create
"identical conditions of supply and.., correspond to... [consumer]
anxieties and expectations .. . ."27 However, it is clear to all parties
involved that the primary concern of the EC Council of Ministers in
writing the Directive lay elsewhere, namely in the health effects to
humans of hormone beef. The controversy has accordingly revolved
around this issue.
C. The U.S. Response
As noted above,2 8 the U.S. views 29 the ban on the importation of
hormone beef as an unjustified nontariff barrier to trade. The
United States bases its argument on the language of the Standards
Code,3 0 a document to which the United States and the members of
the EC, both individually and collectively, are signatories. 3 1 The
Code prohibits the imposition of technical specifications that act as
barriers to trade.
III. The Standards Code
The Standards Code entered into force on January 1, 1980.32
The Code was an outgrowth of concern over NTBs that had been
mounting in the decades prior to its enactment. 33 Though quanti-
24 Id. at Preamble, 228.
25 Id. Prior to the EC directive Germany and Italy had banned the use of hormones.
Telephone interview with Wendy Moore, an International Economist with the Economic
Business/Special Trade and Activity Office, U.S. State Dept. (Mar. 30, 1989) [hereinafter
Moore].
26 Council Directive, supra note 1, Preamble, 228.
27 Id.
28 See supra text accompanying note 5.
29 It should be noted that the hormone beef ban has not been wholly accepted in
Europe either. A European association of drug producers brought a case before the Euro-
pean Court ofJustice challenging the ban, citing the dearth of scientific evidence for the
ban. Mackenzie, supra note 15. Also, last year the European Parliament decided to "reex-
amin[e] the scientific basis for issuing the ban." Ross, supra note 11.
30 Wolf, EC linisters Agree to One- Year Delay in Ban on Meat Treated With Hormones, Wall
St.J., Nov. 19, 1987, at 27, col. 5.
31 Bodies Established Under the 1979 MTA" Agreements and Arrangements, in GATF BASIC
INSTRUMENTS AND SELECTED DOCUMENTS 174, 2, 34th Supp., Sales No. GATT/1988-1
(1988) [hereinafter Bodies Established] (Greece has accepted the Agreement subject to
ratification).
32 Standards Code, supra note 7, art. 15, 6, at 430.
33 Cf Middleton, The GATT Standards Code, 14J. WORLD TRADE L. 201, 201 (1980) (in
[VOL. 14
HORMONE BEEF CONTROVERSY
fying the effects of such NTBs is "most difficult,"' 34 in the latter part
of the 1970s their usage was considered responsible for having "in-
creasingly distortive effects on world commerce."135 Prior to the en-
actment of the Standards Code one type of NTB-technical barriers
to trade-was "subject to virtually no multilateral supervision" 3 6 de-
spite it being one of the more "numerous" NTBs. 37 The Standards
Code was enacted to establish oversight in this area. Agricultural
products are specifically covered by the Code.38
A. The Substantive Language of the Standards Code
The Standards Code "does not attempt to create or harmonize
regulations or standards for individual products;" ' 39 rather, it is
designed to ensure that newly imposed 40 "technical regulations and
standards do not create unnecessary obstacles to international
trade."'4 1 Technical regulations are "technical specification[s] ..
with which compliance is mandatory."'42 Standards are "technical
specification[s] approved by a recognized standardizing body ...
with which compliance is not mandatory.'' 43
The operative phrase here is, of course, "technical specifica-
tion." A technical specification is "[a] specification contained in a
document which lays down characteristics of a product such as levels of
quality, performance, safety or dimensions. It may include, or deal ex-
regard to technical barriers); Note, Introduction to Non-Tariff Baiers to International Trade, 7
BRIDGEPORT L. REV. 155, 165, 186 (1986). "The first serious effort . . . to deal with
nontariff barriers was the Kennedy Round of Tariff Negotiations, which began in 1963."
S. METZGER, LOWERING NONTARIFF BARRIERS 4 (1974). But the nontariff agreements
signed in 1967 had a "most unhappy" life, and thereafter "the trading nations were faced
with practically all of the nontariff barriers that had always beset them in their efforts to
trade with each other." Id. at 6-7.
34 Middleton, supra note 33, at 201; see also S. METZGER, supra note 33, at 7.
35 GATT ACTIVITIES IN 1978, at 29, Sales No. GATT/1979/2 (1979). In part, this
situation existed because "all of the pre-GATT domestic legislation of each of the twenty-
three original (by 1973, eighty-three) signatories that required the imposition of nontariff
barriers to international trade was protected by a [GAIT] grandfather clause from being
considered in violation of GATT." S. METZGER, supra note 33, at 3.
36 Middleton, supra note 33, at 201. See also Bernier, Product Standards and .Aon-Tarff
Obstacles: The GATT Code on Technical Barriers to Trade, in NON-TARIFF BARRIERS AFTER THE
TOKYO ROUND 195, 195 (1982).
37 Middleton, supra note 33, at 201. An inventory of nontariff barriers that was taken
in the years following the Kennedy Round was one-fifth composed of technical barriers to
trade. Nusbaumer, The GATT Standards Code in Operation, 18J. WORLD TRADE L. 542, 542
(1984).
38 Standards Code, supra note 7, at art. 1, 3, at 414.
39 Eicher, Technical Regulations and Standards, in THE URUGUAY ROUND: A HANDBOOK
ON THE MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS 137, 140 (1987).
40 "The Code is prospective in effect, so there is no obligation to alter existing stan-
dards." E. McGOVERN, INTERNATIONAL TRADE REGULATION: GATT, THE UNITED STATES
AND THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY 176 (1982).
41 Standards Code, supra note 7, Preamble, 413 (emphasis added).
42 Id. at Annex 1, 2, at 433.
43 Id. at 3, at 433 (emphasis added).
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clusively with terminology, symbols, testing and test methods, pack-
aging, marking or labelling requirements as they apply to a
product.'44
Though the Standards Code defines a difference between tech-
nical regulations and standards, this difference does not, on its face,
create a distinction for dispute resolution purposes. The "con-
siderfation] that any benefit accruing to ... [a party], directly or indi-
rectly, under . . . [the] Agreement is being nullified or impaired, or
that the attainment of any objective under . . . [the] Agreement is
being impeded, by another Party or Parties" will allow an aggrieved
party to invoke the consultation and dispute settlement provisions of
the agreement.45 Consequently, whenever a party to the agreement
enacts regulations or standards46 that may "have the effect of creating
unnecessary obstacles to international trade" 47 that party may be
subject to consultation and dispute settlement proceedings instituted
by the adversely affected party.
The Standards Code also recognizes that a party may "con-
sider" that other parties are attempting to "circumvent" the agree-
ment "by the drafting of requirements in terms of processes and
production methods (PPMs) [which are not covered by the Code48]
rather than in terms of characteristics of products."'49 In such cases
the "considering" party may also invoke the agreement's dispute set-
tlement procedures. 50
B. Dispute Resolution
The Code's dispute resolution process begins with consultations
between the affected parties. 5' If the consultations prove fruitless
they "shall" be followed, "at the request of any Party to the dispute,"
by a Committee investigation of the matter.52 Should no "mutually
satisfactory solution ... [be reached] within three months of the re-
quest for the Committee investigation ... any Party to the dispute"
may request the Committee to establish either a technical expert
44 Id. at $ 1, at 433 (emphasis added).
45 Id. at art. 14, $$ 2 & 4, at 426 (emphasis added).
46 Generally speaking, standards are enacted by nongovernmental bodies. Nonethe-
less, if the "standards-related activities [of such bodies] are found to create unnecessary
obstacles to international trade, the party in whose territory such . . . bodies are located
would be subject to code proceedings." Foster, The MTX Codes in the GATT linisterial, in
MANAGING TRADE RELATIONS IN THE 1980's 65-66 (1983). See also Standards Code, supra
note 7, at art. 14, $ 24, at 429. This "second level" of obligations for governments party
to the Code is "rare in GATT." Nusbaumer, supra note 37, at 543.
47 Standards Code, supra note 7, at art. 2, 1 1, at 414 (emphasis added).
48 Id. at Annex 1, $ 1, at 433. But see infra notes 88-109 and accompanying text.
49 Id. at art. 14, $ 25, at 429.
50 Id.
51 Id. at 1 1, 2 & 4, at 426.
52 Id. at 1 4, at 426. A Committee investigation of the hormone beef dispute was
begun on May 22, 1987. Bodies Established, supra note 31, at 176, 12.
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group 53 or a panel54 of "government officials knowledgeable in the
area of technical barriers to trade and experienced in the field of
trade relations and economic development" 55 to examine the matter
further. Upon receiving either request the Committee "shall estab-
lish" the requested investigative body. 56
Both technical expert groups and panels are required to make
"findings" but the focus of the findings differ. The findings of tech-
nical expert groups are to be concerned with "the detailed scientific
judgments involved, whether the measure was necessary for the pro-
tection of human, animal or plant life or health, and whether a legiti-
mate scientific judgment is involved."' 5 7 The findings of the panels of
government officials are generally "concerned with broad trade-pol-
icy issues" 58 and are to "assist the Committee in making recommen-
dations or giving rulings on the matter." 59
The last step in the dispute resolution process is the authoriza-
tion of suspension of Code obligations. If the Committee on Techni-
cal Barriers to Trade60 believes "that the circumstances are serious
enough to justify such action, it may authorize one or more parties to
suspend, in respect of any other Party, the application of such obliga-
tions under th[e] Agreement as it determines to be appropriate in
the circumstances. "61
The dispute resolution procedure of the Standards Code, like
those of the other codes adopted in the Tokyo Round, places a
greater emphasis on timely resolution of disputes than the GATT.
For example, consultations between parties are to be "prompt;" un-
til very recently the GATT contained no such advisory adjectives for
the timeliness of consultations. 62 More importantly, the establish-
ment of technical expert groups and panels is mandatory, rather than
53 Standards Code, supra note 7, art. 14, $$ 9-13, at 427, and Annex 2, at 436.
54 Id. at art. 14, I1 14-18, at 427-28, and Annex 3, at 437.
55 Id. at Annex 3, at 437.
56 Id. at art. 14, 11 9 & 14, at 427. The use of mandatory language here is in contrast
to the more permissive language employed in other Tokyo Round agreements. See De
Lacharrire, The Settlement of Disputes Between Contracting Parties to the General Agreement, in
TRADE POLICIEs FOR A BET-rER FUTURE 119, 127 (1987) (pointing specifically to the Under-
standing Regarding Notification, Consultation, Dispute Settlement and Surveillance). The
Understanding "formally documented" GATT's dispute resolution procedure. Note, The
GATT Dispute Settlement Procedure in the 1980s: Where Do We Go From Here?, 5 DICK. J. INT'L L.
82, 89 (1986).
There are no provisions in the Code stating when a panel is to be established and
when a technical expert group is to be. The decision as to which body would be more
appropriate for examining a particular controversy is up to the parties involved. Cf Stan-
dards Code, supra note 7, at art. 14, 44 9 & 14, at 427.
57 Id. at 1 9, at 427 (emphasis added).
58 Middleton, supra note 33, at 217.
59 Standards Code, supra note 7, at art. 14, 15, at 427-28.
60 Id. at art. 13, 1, at 425.
61 Id. at art. 14, 1 21, at 428.
62 Middleton, supra note 33, at 216. In April 1989 the GATT adopted new measures
designed to improve the speed of its procedures; "the new measures impose time limits on
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merely advisory, as it is in the GATT.63 Nonetheless, the Code, like
the GATT, 64 suffers from the absence of effective sanctions. The
most severe punishment that can be meted out by the Committee on
Technical Barriers to Trade is to authorize one party to suspend its
obligations to another. 65 Suspension of obligations has been author-
ized only once under the GATT, 66 and there is slim likelihood of it
ever being authorized under the Code. R.W. Middleton points out
that in the case of standards
the notion of suspension of obligations is largely illusory.... Imple-
mentation of the Code provisions on standards is likely to be of gen-
eral benefit to all countries, and not only to the parties to the Code;
it is difficult to see how, in practice, such benefit can be withdrawn
against one party only.
67
Given the absence of effective sanctions, the Code's enforcement
must depend primarily upon the moral suasion of the Code's free
trade ethic and the desire of signatories to avoid diplomatic conflict.
Though some observers feel the Code has done well in this re-
spect, 68 the hormone beef dispute has not been one of its success
stories.
IV. Application of the Standards Code to the EC Directive
Following fruitless consultations with the EC on the hormone
beef ban, in July 1987 the United States invoked the Code's Article
14.9 dispute resolution settlement procedures for the creation of a
technical expert group. 69 U.S. officials wanted the group to deter-
mine whether the EC Directive had any scientific validity and
whether the ban could have been written as a technical specification,
rather than as a production method. 70 The United States felt that if
the latter were shown then this would be some evidence of circum-
vention of the Code.7 1
The EC blocked this effort, wanting instead the establishment of
a panel of government officials to examine solely the question
each stage of the [dispute resolution] procedure[s]." Bollag, Aew GATT Procedures in Dis-
putes, N.Y. Times, Apr. 13, 1989, at D5, col. 1.
63 De Lacharrire, supra note 56, at 127.
64 Note, The GATT Dispute, supra note 56, at 90.
65 See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
66 Note, The GATT Dispute, supra note 56, at 86-7 & 90.
67 Middleton, supra note 33, at 217 n.l 1.
68 Lawrence Eicher sees the relative informality of the Code as being one of its "ma-
jor strength[s]. . . . A simple reference to the possibility of making use of the dispute
settlement procedures of the code is incentive enough for the parties to arrive at a gen-
tleman's agreement." Eicher, supra note 39. In 1985, for example, the Code's dispute
settlement mechanism was not even invoked. GATT ACTIVITIES IN 1985, at 29, Sales No.
GATT/ 1986-2 (1986).
69 Bodies Established, supra note 31, at 176, 12.
70 Freudenheim, supra note 11; Moore, supra note 25. See also infra notes 88-109 and
accompanying text for a discussion of processes and production methods.
71 Moore, supra note 25 (May 16 and 17, 1989).
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whether it was attempting to circumvent the Code.7 2 The United
States, in turn, rejected this EC maneuver.73 Stalemate has resulted.
As of late spring 1989 formal dispute settlement talks have gone on
for almost two years and proper application of the dispute settlement
procedures of the Code to the hormone beef ban remains in dis-
pute.74 This suggests there are some serious weaknesses in the
Code's dispute settlement procedures.
A. The Circumvention Issue
The United States notes that the language of Article 14.25 al-
lows the invocation of the Code's dispute settlement procedures
whenever a party "considers" there has been a circumvention of an
"obligation" under the Code through the use of PPMs for the draft-
ing of technical regulations. 7 5 The United States asserts that this
"consideration" is a self-judging criteria. 7 6 To the Americans the
threshold for the invocation of the dispute settlement procedures is a
subjective one, a view held by one party about the effects of another
party's trade policies. The United States believes that the next step
after a party invokes Article 14.25 is an assessment of the merits of
its grievances. 7 7
72 Moore, supra note 25. A spokeswoman for the Washington, D.C. office of the EC
Commission refused to comment on any particulars of the hormone beef controversy, cit-
ing their "technical nature." Telephone interview, June 1, 1989.
73 Moore, supra note 25. In February 1989 the U.S. blocked a second attempt by the
EC to establish a panel. U.S. officials stated that they wanted to see the ban's scientific
validity addressed first, which the EC has refused to agree to. Williams, U.S. Again Blocks
EC Bid for Panel on Beef Dispute, 379J. Com. Com., Feb. 10, 1989, at IA, col. 5.
Note that the EC and the United States were able to block the creation of a technical
expert group and a panel, respectively, despite the seemingly mandatory language of Arti-
cles 14.9 and 14.14, which state that the Committee "shall establish" such bodies "upon the
request of any party to the dispute" (emphasis added). Here the informality of the Code
which Eicher refers to appears to be a hindrance toward dispute resolution, rather than a
strong promoter of it. Eicher, supra note 39.
74 Telephone interview with Robert Boehme, a trade officer in the Bureau of Euro-
pean Affairs, U.S. State Department (Mar. 30, 1989). The nub of the problem may be
found in the conflicting ends desired by the parties. Guy Ladreit De Lacharribre notes a
close connection between the "improper operation" of GAIT dispute settlement proce-
dures and the feeling of "at least one of the parties to the dispute ... that the procedures
are being applied to inappropriate rules .. . whose application is . . . not desirable." De
Lacharri~re, supra note 56, at 130.
The Code has no mechanism to break this sort of deadlock. In this the Code does not
differ very much from the GATT itself, in which
[t]he objective remains the formulation of a mutually satisfactory solution,
concern for which continues to take precedence over pure and simple regard
for compliance with the law ....
It is still believed that any sanctions against a contracting party would be
inadvisable, both as regards the general objectives of the GAIT (maximum
liberalization of trade) and as regards effectiveness (very doubtful deterrent
effect).
De Lacharrire, supra, 128-29.
75 Moore, supra note 25. See also Standards Code, supra note 7, at art. 14, 25, at 429.
76 Moore, supra note 25. See also Standards Code, supra note 7, at art. 14, 25, at 429.
77 Moore, supra note 25.
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The Europeans do not agree. They maintain that consideration
of circumvention should not be self-judging. 78 The word "circum-
vention" itself, they say, implies an intent requirement which one
party should not have the right to unilaterally assert about another
party. 79 Central to an examination of the circumvention issue, ac-
cording to the Europeans, is a demonstration of an intent to circum-
vent the Code.80 Only once this is done should the technical aspects
of the matter be addressed. In the case of the EC Directive, say the
Europeans, the requisite intent simply does not exist because the Di-
rective does not operate unfairly against foreigners; all livestock pro-
ducers-both domestic and foreign-are equally affected.8'
Insofar as the language of the EC Directive is nondiscriminatory,
it is in accord with the free trade goals of the GATT.82 One of the
basic premises of the GATT is that "[t]he products . . . of any con-
tracting party imported into . . . any other contracting party shall be
accorded treatment no less favourable than that accorded to like products of
national origin .... "83 The language of the EC directive also dove-
tails nicely with the more subjective nondiscriminatory trade spirit of
the Standards Code set out in Article 2.1 of the Code: "Parties shall
engijre that technical regulations and standards are not prepared,
adopted or applied with a view to creating obstacles to international
trade. ' 8 4 So far the United States has been unable to show that a
78 Id. This dispute over the consideration of circumvention is an excellent example
of What De Lacharri6re noted as the potential for breakdown in dispute settlement proce-
dures when they are applied to what one party sees as inappropriate substantive rules. De
Lacharri re, supra note 56.
79 Moore, supra note 25.
80 Id.
81 Id. Cf. Europeans Criticize US. Over Sanctions, N.Y. Times, Dec. 29, 1988, at D12, col.
4 (reporting comments of Willy de Clercq, the Community's Minister for External Rela-
tions). This argument confounds the traditional criticisms of technical regulations, criti-
cisriis which usually attack the "unequal impact [of technical regulations] on domestic and
foreign products and their excessive severity." Bernier, supra note 36.
82 Kenneth Dam, writing 15 years before the passage of the EC Directive, presciently
described a law that would not violate GATT. He gave the example of
a domestic law [that] prescribes the kinds of coloring materials that may be
used in food, whether domestic or foreign in origin. These coloring materials are
the conventional ones used domestically. Certain foreign producers or can-
ners use, however, other coloring materials. Under these facts it would be stretch-
ing the point to say that national treatment is not accorded on food imports.
K.;DAM, THE GATT: LAW AND INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION 194 (1970)(em-
phasis added). Frieder Roessler is in accord. He notes that
[wihile the GATT aims at integration among markets, it has made practically
no efforts ... to harmonise the interventions within markets. As a result the
Contracting Parties have retained almost complete freedom as regards their
domestic trade policies; that is, policies which make no distinction between the origin
or destination of goods ....
Roessler, supra note 8, at 76 (emphasis added).
83 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, opened for signature Oct. 30, 1947, art. III,
2, T.I.A.S. No. 1700, v.1, at 14, 55 U.N.T.S. 187, 206 [hereinafter GATT] (emphasis
added). In Article 2.1 the Standards Code duplicates the emphasized language.
84 Standards Code, supra note 7, at art. 2, 1, at 414 (emphasis added). Note that this
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principal impetus for the EC decision was the creation of an obstacle
to international trade in hormone beef, as opposed to the adoption
of a set of value preferences 85 for hormone-free beef.
Technically, however, the United States need not win on the dis-
crimination point to carry the day on the- circumvention issue. A
look at the relationship between Article 14.25 and Article 2.1, which
contains "the principle obligations of the Code on technical regula-
tions,"'8 6 demonstrates why. Article 2.1 enounces that the Code em-
braces more than intentionally discriminatory trade actions. Its
ambit extends also to technical regulations which simply "have the
effect of creating unnecessary obstacles to international trade."87 Be-
cause Article 14.25 covers all "obligations" under the Code, the cir-
cumvention language therein applies equally to trade actions with
unintentional effects. In view of this, the European argument re-
garding intent loses much of its force.
B. The Processes and Production Methods Issue
A second argument raised by the Europeans goes to the sub-
stantive aspects of the Code. It is the assertion that the Code simply
does not cover processes and production methods88 and, as a conse-
quence, does not extend to the hormone beef controversy. The ar-
gument over PPMs, considered to be "the major interpretive issue"
of the Code,89 is based upon an explanatory note to Annex 190 that
excludes from the Agreement "codes of practice," 9 1 a synonym for
processes and production methods.92 To the Europeans, the Code
only covers regulation of the "characteristics" of the end product.93
Their position is that the use of growth hormones in cattle raising is
a production method, not a characteristic, and as such does not fall
language may be read as requiring complaining parties to meet a much higher threshold of
proof.
85 The author is indebted to Professor PatrickJ. Conway, Department of Economics,
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, for the observation that the European deci-
sion reflects the adoption of a value preference which, given its applicability to all produ-
cers, is not inconsistent with attaining full gains from free trade. An example of a similar
value preference made by the United States was the institution some years ago of tough
antipollution controls on all new motor vehicles sold in the United States, a decision which
affected both domestic manufacturers and foreign exporters to this country. This decision
altered the pattern of trade for the United States, but did not reduce the optimal gains
from free trade.
86 Middleton, supra note 33, at 205.
87 Standards Code, supra note 7, art. 2, I, at 414 (emphasis added).
88 Farnsworth, Trade Retaliation Readied If Europe Bars Mleats Of U.S., N.Y. Times, Dec.
27, 1988, at AI, col. 3; Moore, supra note 25.
89 Foster, supra note 46, at 66.
90 "The three annexes to the agreement constitute an integral part thereof." Ber-
nier, supra note 36, at 200.
91 Standards Code, supra note 7, Annex 1, 1, at 433.
92 Moore, supra note 25.
93 Cf supra note 39-44 and accompanying text.
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under the Code's jurisdiction. 94
The language of the EC Directive carefully tracks this viewpoint.
The domestic aspect of the ban is phrased in terms of prohibiting
"the use of hormonal substances for fattening purposes ' 95 while the
prohibition on imports refers to "meat from animals to which have
been administered" growth hormones. 96 Nowhere does the Directive
speak of meat containing growth hormones. 97
To the United States, the argument that the EC Directive is pri-
marily a ban on a production method is simply not credible. The
United States sees the Directive as attempting to assure a product
characteristic: the absence of artificially-added hormones in beef.98
U.S. officials believe that the Directive could have been drafted less
restrictively as a product specification which would fall under the
Standard Code's jurisdiction. 99 They also believe that present U.S.
regulations could have met any hormone tolerance level set, no mat-
ter how low.100 That the, Directive was instead drafted as a PPM also
indicates that there was circumvention of the Code.10 '
The U.S. view that the Directive could have been written as a
product specification has some merit. Given that the true rationale
for the EC Directive is to protect public health from the perceived
dangers of hormones in animal products, 0 2 the EC stance that its
Directive applies to production methods is rebuttable by the argu-
ment that the Directive is addressed to a quality or safety characteris-
tic of a product and is therefore legislation ripe for assessment under
94 Farnsworth, supra note 88. Andrzej Olechowski states that NTBs "introduced
outside GATT rules" are "illegal NTBs." Olechowski, Vontariff Bamiers to Trade, in THE
URUGUAY ROUND: A HANDBOOK ON THE MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS 121, 126
(1987). If the hormone beef ban could be shown to be an unnecessary NTB, keeping the
ban "outside GAIT rules," as the Europeans are arguing, would presumably cause com-
mentators like Olechowski to classify the ban as an "illegal NTB." For a discussion of the
necessity issue in this case, see infra notes 110-27 and accompanying text.
95 Council Directive, supra note 1, Preamble, 228 (emphasis added).
96 Id. at art. 6, 1, at 230 (emphasis added).
97 There is good reason for this. According to Lester Crawford of the U.S. Agricul-
ture Department, three of the five hormones banned by the EC are naturally produced and
cannot be detected. Ross, supra note 11. Properly applied, the synthetic hormones cannot
be detected either. Moore, supra note 25 (May 22, 1989).
98 Moore, supra note 25 (May 16 and 19, 1989).
99 Id. (May 22, 1989).
100 The U.S. position is that current U.S. regulations, which require a 60 day with-
drawal period prior to slaughter, result in virtually all artificial hormones being "flushed
from the animal's system." Id. The use of naturally produced hormones cannot even be
detected. Ross, supra note 11.
101 Moore, supra note 25 (May 16 & 17 1989). For the wording of the circumvention
provision of the Standards Code, see Article 14.25.
A simplistic way of assessing the U.S. position is that it considers a product's charac-
teristics to trump its production method and for this reason should be the focus of scru-
tiny. Insofar as it advances this view, critics might see the current U.S. negotiating stance
as an attempt to extend the Standards Code beyond its intended reach.
102 See supra notes 10-27 and accompanying text.
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the Code. 10 3
But will the U.S. view prevail? A past trade dispute between the
United States and the United Kingdom indicates that its chances may
be poor. In 1980 a controversy grew out of the British imposition on
imported poultry of processing requirements designed to reduce the
possibility of salmonella contamination. These requirements were
adopted to conform with an EC Directive on the issue.' 0 4 Unlike the
hormone ban, the processing requirements were instituted in a dis-
criminatory fashion; poultry imported to Britain from non-EC coun-
tries was required to be chilled in accordance with the new process,
while poultry from domestic and EC producers was to have the pro-
cess phased in over a two year period. 10 5
U.S. efforts to characterize the requirements as a product speci-
fication and pursue resolution of the dispute through the Standards
Code were eventually dropped when U.S. officials realized that many
signatories felt the processing methods adopted by the British were
indeed legitimate processing methods and outside the Code's juris-
diction. 10 6 Given the nondiscriminatory application of the present
EC hormone ban, and the much greater strength of the current op-
position, the United States may well be fighting an uphill battle on
the technical specification/PPMs issue.
On the other hand, the poultry dispute may be distinguished
from the hormone beef dispute in at least two important respects.
First, the British processing requirements were directed to a clearly
recognizable health threat-salmonella contamination. Second, the
EC directive upon which the British trade action was based was
passed before the Standards Code came into effect. Since the Stan-
dards Code was designed to apply prospectively 10 7 an argument may
be made that it should not have applied to the poultry dispute at all.
Yet, there is an important similarity between the two disputes.
In both a party to the Code sought to employ PPMs to meet a per-
ceived health threat from agricultural products believed to be con-
taminated. Both cases therefore raise the question of the dividing
line between technical regulations, which fall under the Standards
Code, and processes and production methods, which do not.
Neither case has answered this question. If there is no answer, as
currently seems to be true, any party to the Code can seemingly write
103 Note that the Code's definition of a technical specification includes "safety charac-
teristics" of a product. Standards Code, supra note .7, Annex 1, 1, at 433.
104 Council Directive 78/50/EEC, 20 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 15) 28 (1977); Moore,
supra note 25 (May 22, 1989).
105 Foster, supra note 46, at 66; Moore, supra note 25 (May 22, 1989); Council Direc-
tive 78/50/EEC, 20 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 15) art. I (art. 14, 2), at 28 (1977).
106 Foster, supra note 46, at 66. Foster notes that most of the signatories that ap-
proved of the British legislation were EC countries. Id. They, too, were bound by the EC
directive.
107 E. McGOVERN, supra note 40, at 176.
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technical regulations as PPMs and avoid any application of the Stan-
dards Code.108 If so, the hormone beef controversy may be demon-
strating that the Code may be an ineffective instrument for
addressing the problem of agricultural additives.
A convergence of views on the nature of product characteristics
and process and production methods is absolutely necessary. With-
out a meeting of minds on the definitions of these terms the Stan-
dards Code will lose credibility as an international trading accord.
The application of PPMs, which are currently unregulated under the
GATT, may well increase, with most undesirable results. In particu-
lar, parties to the Code could avoid their Code responsibilities by
cloaking technical specifications for agricultural additives in the man-
tle of PPMs. At least one commentator has observed that "[t]he po-
tential for trade disruption by discriminatory application of...
[PPM] measures . . . is enormous, particularly in the agricultural
area."' 1 9 As will be shown below, even when "such measures" are
nondiscriminatory the likely trade effects could create problems for
Third World nations in the near future.
C. A Fundamental Issue. Is the Directive an "Unnecessary"
Trade Barrier?
A nation has the sovereign prerogative to promulgate regula-
tions that are designed to secure the physical well-being of its in-
habitants, a prerogative that the GATT has always recognized' 10 as
"an exception to the provisions of the General Agreement.""' The
Standards Code contains a similar escape clause; parties to the Code
may institute technical barriers to trade so long as such barriers are
"necessary to ensure .. the protection of human ... life or health," and do
not "arbitrar[ily] or unjustifiabl[y] discriminat[e] between countries
• ..or [act as] a disguised restriction on international trade."'' 2
Thus, even if the EC Directive was found to be a technical regulation,
if it could be shown to be "necessary" the directive would be one
which the Standards Code would "recognize" the EC as being al-
lowed to "take."' 1 From this it follows that the negotiations over
circumvention and PPMs versus technical regulations, while of im-
108 This is, of course, even truer when the adopted measures are nondiscriminatory.
109 Foster, supra note 46, at 66-67.
I 10 The GATT states:
Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in a manner
which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination
between countries where the same conditions prevail, or a disguised restric-
tion on international trade, nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to prevent
the adoption or enforcement by any contracting party of measures ... necessary to protect
human, animal or plant life or health.
GATT, supra note 83, art. XX(I)(b), at 56-57 (emphasis added).
I K. DAM, supra note 82, at 193.
112 Standards Code, supra note 7, Preamble, 413 (emphasis added).
113 Id.
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portance, are simply barriers to reaching the fundamental issue un-
derlying Standards Code treatment of the EC Directive: Does the
Directive create an unnecessary 114 obstacle to international trade?
The burden of proof as to what is unnecessary to protect human
life or health lies with the complaining party.' 15 American officials
feel that they have sustained that burden of proof, 1 6 and assert that
the Europeans have not been able to "present any evidence that
proper application of the growth-producing hormones in question
poses any threat to human health."' "17 The banned hormones have
received approval for use in beef by both a U.N. Food and Agricul-
ture commission, 1 8 a presumably unbiased organization, and the
U.S. Food and Drug Administration." 9 As previously mentioned, a
scientific panel commissioned by the EC itself was disbanded when it
could find no evidence that the use of growth hormones was
unsafe. 120
The Europeans believe that there is no scientific evidence which
can provide complete assurances that beef treated with growth hor-
mones will be risk-free. 12 1 Insofar as they are fearful of hormone
beef causing cancer 122 there is some basis for the belief that an abso-
lute ban is better than a low threshold for hormone presence.
Animal studies are presently used to determine the cancer-caus-
ing effects on humans of a multitude of products found in our envi-
ronment. Such studies have been used in the United States to
114 As will be shown below, "the question whether technical regulations ... effectively
create unnecessary obstacles to trade is open to many interpretations." Nusbaumer, supra
note 37, at 545.
115 Cf Middleton, supra note 33, at 206.
116 Cf. Bater, U.S. Picks a Beef That Mlay U'nify Europe Fast, L.A. Times, Dec. 6, 1988,
§ II, at 7, col. 1.
117 US. Lists Europe Goods That Face Retaliation, N.Y. Times, Dec. 28, 1988, at D2, col. 5
(quoting former U.S. trade representative Clayton K. Yeutter).
118 Ross, supra note 11.
119 Id. According to Dr. Gerald B. Guest, director of the Center for Veterinary
Medicine at the Food and Drug Administration, when properly used the traces of natu-
rally-produced hormones in meat are so minuscule that "a man himself would manufac-
ture 1,500 times more estrogen every day than he would get if he consumed a pound of
beef every day, and a pregnant woman would manufacture several million times more es-
trogen a day than if she ate a pound of beef each day." Kolata, supra note 11. See also
similar comments by Dr. Gary C. Smith, head of the Department of Animal Science at
Texas A & M University, in Hall, A Confusing Quest for 'Natural' Beef, N.Y. Times, Mar. 1,
1989, at 15. U.S. consumer groups agree that hormone beef is safe so long as it is raised in
accordance with government regulations. Where consumer groups part with industry
groups is in "how faithfully the regulations are followed." Id.
120 See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
121 Cf. Auerbach, supra note 14. For a contrasting view on this issue, see Brody, Personal
Health, N.Y. Times, Mar. 23, 1989, at 20, col. I ("[T]echnological advances.., permit
scientists to detect minute quantities of chemicals, down to levels of one in a quadril-
lion .... just because a chemical can be detected at very low levels does not necessarily
mean it can affect human health.").
122 Ross, supra note 11 (noting comments of Ms. Ella Krucoff, spokeswoman for the
EC Washington office).
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determine the effects on humans of consuming hormone beef. 123
Yet, a 1979 report by the National Academy of Sciences concluded
that "uncertainty about carcinogenic mechanisms makes it impossi-
ble to use animal data to estimate with confidence the degree of
human risk." 124 Furthermore, the mathematical models used for risk
assessment can produce results that vary considerably. 125
The debate over what hormone level is necessary or unnecessary
to protect human health boils down, in essence, to the question of
whether there is a level of acceptable risk. Insofar as economic trade-
offs must be made for adopting incrementally higher levels of safety,
that question straddles the ground between science and public pol-
icy. The existing machinery of the Standards Code appears
equipped to deal with this issue through the use of the panels au-
thorized by Article 14.14,126 but as of late spring 1989 it has not had
the opportunity to do so in the hormone beef dispute.12 7
Should the acceptable risk issue ever be reached in the negotia-
tions the United States and the European Community may be forced
to deal with three, closely related issues. 128 First, assuming that food
products containing additives are covered by the Code, must an ag-
grieved party prove a negative: that no risk is presented by food con-
taining particular additives?. If so, the Code may be a dead letter in
regard to agricultural trade since proving that an additive is 100 per-
cent safe is often impossible.' 29-
Second, if the aggrieved party need not prove a negative, then
what level of safety must it prove? And who will determine where
the safety levels must be set? This, too, presents a difficult dilemma.
Few nations, if any, are willing to subordinate their health legislation
to the dictates of outside actors. Fewer still will agree to health regu-
lations less strict than their own.
Third, does the Code's escape clause for "measures necessary to
123 Telephone interview with Dr. Bill Keller, Chief of Hormone and Pharmacologic
Agents, Center for Veterinary Medicine, U.S. Food and Drug Administration (Mar. 31,
1989).
124 COMMITTEE FOR A STUDY ON SACCHARIN AND FOOD SAFETY POLICY, INSTITUTE OF
MEDICINE AND THE NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL/ASSEMBLY OF LIFE SCIENCES, FOOD
SAFETY POLICY: SCIENTIFIC AND SOCIETAL CONSIDERATIONS, Part 2, 5-23 (1979), cited in
Silverglade, The Risks of Risk Assessment and Risk-Benefit Analysis, 38 FOOD DRUG CosM. LJ.
318, 319 n.8 (1983).
125 In the 1979 report by National Academy of Sciences the risk estimates which re-
sulted from the four different mathematical modes used varied five million-fold. Id. at 319.
126 The panels of government officials authorized by Article 14.14 are concerned with
the policy aspects, rather than the technical aspects, of a questioned regulation. See text
accompanying supra notes 58-59. See also Standards Code, supra note 7, Annex 3, I, at
437.
127 See text accompanying supra notes 69-74.
128 The author wishes to acknowledge the insights of Professor Arthur M. Weisburd,
School of Law, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, which led to these issues. All
culpability for any shortcomings in the development of these issues is the author's alone.
129 See supra notes 124-25 and accompanying text. But see Brody, supra note 121.
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ensure ... the protection of human ... health"130 extend to matters
of psychological health? The question here is whether trade legisla-
tion which is primarily a response to popular concern over adverse
physical health effects, but which is otherwise scientifically untena-
ble, 13 1 may pass muster under the Code. The Code itself,132 like the
GATT,13 3 simply refers to protection of "human, animal or plant...
health." While human health is not broken down into physical
health and psychological health, the inclusion of "animal or plant"
health in both texts indicates that both sets of drafters intended to
limit the respective escape clauses to physical health effects.' 34
V. Ramifications for World Agricultural Trade
Unless the current stalemate in the U.S.-EC negotiations over
the hormone beef ban is resolved, world trade in livestock and agri-
culture could be threatened by a Pandora's box of NTBs designed to
restrict trade in food products containing chemical additives which
are thought to be unhealthy. Food products are commonly subject
to a wide range of additives; in addition to the use of growth hor-
mones in beef, for example, there is widespread use of antibiotics 13 5
in livestock and pesticides 136 in crops. Evidence suggests that, in
130 Standards Code, supra note 7, Preamble, 413.
131 By "scientifically untenable" I mean a situation where the health benefits of trade
legislation are equalled or outweighed by the health costs. In regard to hormone beef this
would be the case if it could be shown that the quantities of leaner beef produced by cattle
treated with growth hormones, in combination with the associated risks of the hormones
themselves, was safer for consumers than hormone-free beef, which has a much higher fat
content and presents consumers with adverse health consequences related to this higher
fat content. As previously noted, however, determining levels of health risk and con-
ducting the required cost-benefit analysis is an inexact science.
132 Standards Code, supra note 7, Preamble, 413.
133 GATT, supra note 83, art. XX, § I(b).
134 Readers who wish to consider the psychological health issue further may be inter-
ested in a unanimous 1982 U.S. Supreme Court decision, Metropolitan Edison Co. v. Peo-
ple Against Nuclear Energy, 460 U.S. 766. Plaintiffs sought to show that federal law
requiring an assessment of "environmental impact" and any unavoidable adverse environ-
mental effects of an agency proposal also required an assessment of psychological damage
to residents in the vicinity. The agency in question was the Nuclear Regulatory Commis-
sion and the action in dispute was whether to restart a shut down nuclear reactor. The
Court found that "the particular psychological injury alleged . . .did not arise ... out of
the direct sensory impact of a change in the environment ... but out of a perception of risk,"
and was therefore not covered by the statute in question. Id. at 779 (Brennan,J., concur-
ring) (emphasis added).
135 "Most growers raising livestock give the animals antibiotics in their feed." Antibiot-
ics and Livestock: Feeding A Controversy, 10 HARV. MED. SCH. HEALTH LETrER I (August 1985).
There are strikingly similar parallels between the controversy over the use of growth hor-
mones and the use of antibiotics in raising livestock. The use of antibiotics also produces a
large economic return to farmers but "[o]pponents contend that the drugs encourage the
growth of drug-resistant bacteria, which can be transmitted to people and cause illness
.... Since the 1970s, several European countries have enacted bans on the use of certain
antibiotics in livestock feeds, but no such restrictions exist in this country." Id. at 1-2.
136 Note, Restrictions on the Exportation of Hazardous Products to the Third World: Regulatory
Imperialism or Ethical Responsibility?, 5 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 129, 132-33 (1985).
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contrast to the use of growth hormones, these other additives pose a
definite risk to human health, 137 and the preoccupation about such
additives is growing. 13 8  Given the heightened concern in recent
years among western consumers about what they eat, it may only be
a matter of time before the public in western countries begins de-
manding increased curbs on the presence of such substances as an-
tibiotics and pesticides in imported food. 139 The likelihood of
consumer success in obtaining such curbs is far from small; as one
observer has stated, "[i]nternational trade is mostly a matter of do-
mestic politics."140
137 In regard to antibiotics see Antibiotics and Livestock: Feeding A Controversy, supra note
135, at 3 ("[A] study conducted by the Centers for Disease Control [in 1984] .... pro-
vided strong circumstantial evidence that a particular strain of salmonella originated in a
herd of cattle that had been fed the antibiotic chlortetracycline. These bacteria, in turn,
caused 18 cases of diarrhea (one of them fatal) in humans."); Schnieder, Congress Looks to
the American Table Amid Questions on Food Safety, N.Y. Times, June 22, 1987, at A14 ("Scott
Holmberg, a medical epidemiologist at the Centers for Disease Control, said in an inter-
view that at least 500,000 of the 2 million cases of salmonella illness estimated to occur in
the United States each year are linked to the low-level use of antibiotics in livestock.").
In regard to pesticides see Weisskopf, New Pesticide Policy Leaves Residue of Questions,
Wash. Post, Oct. 24, 1988, at AI I ("[T]he E.P.A .... licenses 66 pesticides found to cause
cancer in laboratory animals."); Schnieder, Pesticide Regulation Slow and Unsteady, N.Y.
Times, Mar. 19, 1989, § 4, at E7, col. I (Dozens of other pesticides "are known to cause
birth defects, nervous system disorders and other chronic illnesses."). See also id., Food
Industry is Testing for Toxics to Reassure Consumers on Crops, N.Y. Times, Mar. 27, 1989, at 1,
col. 1. The article describes the growing concern of American consumers over pesticides
in their foods and notes a May 1987 National Academy of Sciences report that stated more
than 20 widely used pesticides could cause thousands of additional cancer cases in the
United States.fcisBut see Brody, supra note 121 ("According to the best available scientific
estimates 99.9% of carcinogens in the diet come from natural sources."). Brody's figure is
somewhat misleading in that it refers to the number of carcinogens in our diet, as opposed
to the amount.
Dietary patterns may have more to do with cancer rates than chemical contaminants.
According to Dr. Joseph H. Hotchkiss, a food toxicologist at the New York State College
of Agricultural and Life Sciences at Cornell University: "There is no evidence that remov-
ing [tiny amounts ofl chemicals A, B, C and X [from the diet] will do anything to reduce
the risk of cancer, but there is a lot of evidence that eating more high-fiber foods and less
fat will." Id.
138 Eighty-four percent of Americans surveyed in a Harris poll between November 9
and 23, 1988, said they would choose organically grown food "if it cost the same as...
[food] grown with synthetic fertilizers or pesticides ...." Forty-nine percent of those
surveyed said they would pay more for organically grown food. Organic Produce Preferred,
N.Y. Times, Mar. 21, 1989, at A16, col. 1.
139 At present, for example, only "one percent of the estimated one million food ship-
ments entering the United States annually are ever checked for dangerous pesticide resi-
dues," despite the fact that when checked such shipments show illegal pesticide residues at
twice the level of domestic produce. Meier, As Food Imports Rise, Consumers Face Peril From Use
of Pesticides, Wall St. J., Mar. 26, 1987, at 1, col. 1. Even when imports are checked the
actual amount of testing currently done is very limited; "a wide variety of pesticides, some
of which can cause cancer," are not tested for under present U.S. procedures. Shabecoff,
Pesticides Called Manageable Evil, N.Y. Times, May 1, 1987, at A24, col. 6.
140 Nau, Preface to DOMESTIC TRADE POLITICS AND THE URUGUAY ROUND xiii (1989). See
also Kerr, International Trade in Beef-Technical Issues for the Current GATT Negotiations, 10 J.
AGRIC. TAX'N & L. 55, 58 (1988) ("The weight given to GATT considerations varies with
the strength and urgency of domestic interests"); and supra note 21 (regarding the EC
taking consumer interests into account in deciding on the hormone beef ban).
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In the case of pesticides, many of the most dangerous pesticides
are banned by western countries but used extensively in the Third
World. 14  A "boomerang effect"' 142 presently results to western
countries that export dangerous pesticides to the Third World and
then import agricultural products from the Third World; the pesti-
cides whose use they ban in their own lands ironically end up on
their dinner plates. 143 Growing consumer concern for a healthy diet
could well result in the enactment of bans on agricultural products
contaminated with pesticides not approved for use in the West. In
light of the EC's action on hormone beef and the uncertainties sur-
rounding the ill effects on humans of many pesticides, total bans on
agricultural products containing any quantity of unapproved pesti-
cide residues is not an unlikely possibility. Such bans could easily be
worded as PPMs, thereby avoiding coverage under the Standards
Code or any other GATT arrangement. 44 Since a large portion of
the pesticides applied abroad are unapproved in the West, 145 the
damage caused to Third World agricultural exports and economies
by outright bans on tainted foodstuffs could be considerable. 146
141 Cf. Note, Restrictions on the Exportation, supra note 136, at 134 ("[T]wenty-five per-
cent of all pesticides sold overseas by U.S. companies [in 1979] were products whose use
was prohibited or severely restricted in the United States because of the dangers posed to
health, safety, or the environment."); D. WEIR AND M. SCHAPIRO, infra note 145.
142 Goldberg, Efforts to Prevent Misuse of Pesticides Exported to Developing Countries: Progress-
ing Beyond Regulation and Notification, 12 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1025, 1028 (1985).
143 A 1979 report by the General Accounting Office stated that "[p]esticide use pat-
terns in foreign countries clearly indicate that a large portion of food imported into the
United States may in fact contain unsafe pesticide residues." Quoted in Nicholas, Problems in
the Control of Pesticide Residue on Imported Foods, 1981 FOOD DRUG CosM. L.J. 573, 587. See
also, Goldberg, supra note 142, at 1028-29; Meir, supra note 139.
144 No other GATT codes presently regulate processes and production methods, and
the main provisions of the GATT itself that deal with technical barriers to trade "have not
proved very effective" in this respect. Bernier, supra note 36, at 198.
145 A statistical breakdown of the number of illegal pesticides residues on foods im-
ported to the United States may be found in D. WEIR AND M. SCHAPIRO, CIRCLE OF POISON
82 (1981).
146 For example, 70% of the total value of agricultural production in Central America
is exported. Id. at 32.
In recognition of the adverse impact on Third World exporters that U.S. standards
can have, the U.S. State Department has intervened in the recent past to prevent tighten-
ing of regulations for pesticide residues on imported foods. Such intervention occurred in
1985 when a ban on residues of the pesticide ethylene dibromide (EDB), a suspected car-
cinogen, was to be enforced on imported foods, particularly mangoes. Its domestic use
had been banned since 1983. The State Department pressured the EPA into cancelling its
planned enforcement of the EDB ban on imported mangoes, arguing "it might be eco-
nomically harmful to Mexico and Haiti, two major mango-exporting nations, as well as
damaging to U.S.-financed mango-growing projects" in Belize and Guatemala that relied
on EDB. Meier, supra note 139.
Simply banning the use of dangerous pesticides would not be an easy solution for
many Third World countries. Basic food crops in the Third World are now often grown
with "miracle seeds" developed as part of the "green revolution." These hybrid seeds
produce higher yields but are more susceptible to pests and consequently more dependent
on protection with pesticides. D. WEIR AND M. SCHAPIRO, supra note 143, at 36 & 38. "The
FAO estimates that by the year 2000, 67% of the seeds used in underdeveloped countries
will be the 'improved' varieties, which in most cases are more vulnerable to pests." Id. at
N.CJ. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
Given that most of the signatories to the Code are developed
countries, and not Third World countries, 147 this would hold with
even greater force because aggrieved countries who are not Code
signatories are unable to use the Code's dispute resolution mecha-
nisms. 148 And, as noted above, outside of the Code there are no
other mechanisms in the GATT for dealing with technical standards.
VI. Conclusion
Writing two decades ago, in pre-Code times, Kenneth Dam
noted that "[o]ne of the most troublesome administrative barriers to
trade arises from health and safety regulations."'' 49 This Comment
has attempted to illustrate the problems of interpretation and public
policy which are presented when such regulations are challenged
under the Standards Code. Chief among these problems is the un-
defined level of health risk that parties to the Standards Code must
meet in determining, or challenging, technical specifications.' 50 At
present, it is impossible to say when the desire to maintain historical
free trade in a particular product must give way to a country's right
to "tak[e] measures necessary to ensure ... the protection of human
... health."' 5 ' Related subsidiary issues are not even close to being
addressed in the present negotiating stalemate. Among these is the
intriguing one of whether the Code allows a country to enact trade
measures designed solely to assuage unreasonable public concerns
over health risks. Namely, can the psychological health of a popula-
tion serve as a pretext for utilizing the Code's "necessary" escape
clause? Settlement of these questions lies behind resolution of the
comparatively minor circumvention and PPM questions that are cur-
rently under debate, and ultimately will be far more difficult.
There is at least one possible answer to the Standards Code di-
lemma on agricultural products. That is to substitute labeling at the
retail level for an outright ban on foods that pose uncertain health
43. Furthermore, some of the high yield seeds "require particular applications of... pesti-
cides to produce their high yields." Id. at 44-45.
147 See Status of Tokyo Round Agreements on 1 June 1986, in THE URUGUAY ROUND: A
HANDBOOK ON THE MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS Annex 5, at 243.
148 Cf Standards Code, supra note 7, art. 14, at 426-27.
149 K. DAM, supra note 82, at 192.
150 Even if the question whether the EC Directive is a PPM or a technical regulation is
resolved in favor of it being a PPM the issue will survive. This is because a similar "neces-
sity" escape clause is found in the GATT itself. See supra note 110. Consequently, unless a
GATT signatory wishes to have its standards-related trade legislation considered an "ille-
gal NTB," it will always have to confront the health risk issue. See supra note 94.
151 Standards Code, supra note 7, Preamble, at 413. As noted above, however, in an
economic sense free trade and the adoption of a preference for certain products are not
necessarily incompatible. See supra note 85. On a purely economic level, therefore, the
issue of standards-related health legislation can be stripped of its complexity. This is small
comfort, of course, to agricultural producers who have embraced the use of additives to
enhance their yields.
[VOL. 14
HORMONE BEEF CONTROVERSY
risks. The information on labels could range from merely stating the
country of origin 152 to giving more detailed information. In the case
of produce this more detailed information might, for example, state
whether the produce was organically grown or whether it was grown
with particular pesticides. Labels on meat products could state
whether the meat was raised with specific growth hormones or
antibiotics.
With this kind of labeling consumers could balance perceived
health risks with the benefits of the lower prices and enhanced quali-
ties which additives are said to provide for food products. In this
way consumers themselves could be the ultimate arbiters of their
well-being, and parties to the Code could meet their free trade re-
sponsibilities to one another with less rancor. Although some ob-
servers deny labeling as a solution to these kinds of problems,153 the
seeming intractability of the hormone beef dispute and future food
additive disputes suggests that labeling may be the only way to deal
with the many difficult issues involved in a manner which provides
some satisfaction to all parties.
Absent the adoption of labeling, it is quite likely that, given the
uncertain scientific data regarding health risks, resolution of the hor-
mone beef dispute and future food additive controversies will be po-
litically impossible for signatories of the Code. While the use of
technical expert groups or panels-when utilized-is a way for Code
signatories to obtain an impartial assessment of the rationale under-
lying a particular technical specification, such assessments are ulti-
mately of little value if they are contrary to the popularly expressed
wishes of a people regarding such an emotional issue as health.
Therefore, even if the current deadlock on dispute resolution proce-
dures is broken, the Standards Code alone may be unable to resolve
the food additive problem.
ADRIA N RAFAEL HALPERN*
152 In at least 80 developing countries where "very toxic pesticides are widely avail-
able . . . [there are] no adequate system[s] to approve, register or monitor the material."
Simons, Concern Rising Over Harm From Pesticides in Third World, N.Y. Times, May 30, 1989,
at 21, col. 1. Labeling foodstuffs with the country of origin would enable American con-
sumers, for example, to decide whether they would rather eat domestically grown oranges
or those from countries like Brazil or Mexico, where pesticide controls are more lax.
153 Nicholas, supra note 143, at 581 ("Consumer labeling has generally been rejected
as an approach to the problems of food safety. Regarding pesticide residues, the effort
and cost that would be required to institutionalize a labelling program is staggering.").
But see Christopher, Approaches for Achieving Food Safety, 35 FOOD DRUG CosM. L.J. 58, 61
(1979) ("To be sure, as with most things, there are times when exceptions must be made.
It may be that there will be need to allow unsafe foods on the market- safeguarding the
public by labeling as best can be .... Sugar substitutes may be an example.").
* The author dedicates this Comment to his grandmother, Sra. Lucia Esther Wood-
gate de Alfonzo, of Buenos Aires, Argentina.
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